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Introduction 
With the term Hoare-Zike lugic we have in mind some proof system designed for 
the formal manipulation of assertions about the partial correctnesls of program texts 
witR respect to a tied interpretation A for the programming language. Stated 
simply, and informally, our aim in this paper is to exhibit some familiar algebraic 
structures A over which any sound Honre-like logic for the partial correctness of 
while-program computations in A will possess some unfamiliar structural properties. 
From this exercise follows somewhat stronger incompleteness results than those first 
reported in Cook [lo] and in Wand [25] for Hoare’s original system about while- 
programs. And, as we shall make clear in a moment, these results in turn address 
some sharply defined issues in the theoretical literature to do with the comple:tity of 
the programming language in the design of a Hoare logic. 
Our point of departure is Hoare’s proof system as it is formailly co&tutr!d for 
while-programs in [lo]. We take it for granted that the reader is familiar wizh the 
papers Hoare [l3], Coo& [lo] and Wand [25]: with these prerequisites, or the 
invaluable survey paper Apt [lj, we can discuss ow examples in more technical 
terms. 
Let A be any relational structure and let -TKp be ttie class of all w 
destined to compute functions on A. On choosing the first-order logical lang?~~:~ge L 
as assertion language, and applying a definition of thy semantics Y’ of VV.9 to 
interpretation A, one may identify the study of partial correctness for %V compu- 
tations over A as the study of a <set PC(A), the partial correctness theory for WCP on A. 
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PC(A) is defined to be the set 
h’)S{q): P, q E L, S E -W? &A b(p)s(q}} 
wherein A t= {p)S{q} means henever p is true of ad initid stat4 for S then either S 
terminates in a state for whi th q is true or S diverges. 
With the same level of gererality, one can define tile standard Hoare logic HLo(A) 
for -pa/“g, onA as the set of all triples (p)S{q} generated by Hoare’s proof rules for -?V’9’ 
and including the usually undecidable first-order thctory Th(A) of A as axioms. For 
any set&Se program semantics 9, I-&,(A) is sound in the sense that HLo(A)c 
PC(A). In [IO], Cook showed that if I, is expressive for -Wg over A then HI&A) is 
compMe in the sense that HLO(A) = PC(A), Of more interest to us, on this occasion, 
is another theorem of [IO]: if A is Presburger arithmetic then HLo(A) is not 
complete; and also Wand’s more detailed analysis of incompleteness [25] wherein he 
gave a simple, although artificial, structure A and al.1 asserted program {p}S{q} such 
that { p)S{q) E PC(A) butr { p}S{q} & HLo(A). After settling on a weak criterion for a 
set of asserted programs to qualify as a Hoare logil.:, we will build up some general 
theory from which one can read off more extreme examples of incompleteness: 
Theorem, Let A be Presburger arithmetic, the field of real algebraic numbers, or the 
field of algebraic numbers. Then A is a computable @ebraic structure with decidable 
@rsf-order theory Th(A) such that 
(I) each sound Howe Iogic HL(A) 3 HLo(A) is r.&. but not recursive; 
(2) PC(A) is co-r.e. but not recursive; in fact, PCI’A? is a complete co-r.e. set. 
Therefure, A has no sound and complete Hoare logk for its while-programs ; and, in 
particular, A fails to possess even a sound, if incomplete, Hoare logic which is recursive. 
First, let us compare the theorem with the well understood intermediate situation 
of the standard model of arithmetic IV. By Cook’s Co;npleteness Theorem, HL&V) is 
sound and complete, of course. The three components Th(N), HL&V) and PC(N) 
are highly non-constructive for they are not arithmetical sets, but they are of the 
same complexity, each having Turing degree O”, see Rogers [23]. For the A of the 
theorem the situation is quite the reverse: no completeness possible and, whatever 
Hoare logic HL(A) is chosen, Th(A), HL(A) and PC(A) are arithmetical and 
effective, but in three disparate ways (up to Turing equivalence). In view of the fact 
that for any finite structure A, HL&I) = PC(A), it is presumably the case that 
Presburger Arithmetic is the canonical example of a structure for which no useful 
Hoare-like logic is available to reason about partial correctness for such a simple 
program language as V9? This is certainly supporaed by the theorem that there is 
indeed a nice Hoare logic, which is sound and complete, for certain loop-programs 
over Presburger Arithmetic: see Cherniavsky and Gamin [g]. 
In this way one is Ied to reflect on the rGPe of the complexity of prograin languages 
in seeking sound and complete Hoare lagics. Although our examples are familiar 
(and simpler, at least in the case of Presbur ger Arithmetic), Wand’s structure is by no 
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means redundant as it makes the point that the computational powe,r of a, program 
language is not necessarily a factor in its possession of a complete Hoare logic: on 
Wand’s structure, the while-programs compute rather trivial functions whereas on 
ours they compute all recursive functions. On the other hand, there is a particularly 
striking incompleteness theorem in Clarke [9] which cays that for very rich program 
languages there can be no Hoare-like logic for the partial correctness of their 
computations on finite structures. Of course, for while-programs, augmented by many 
programming constructs, explicit Hoare logics which are complete for finite struc- 
tures are known, see [9] and the survey paper [l]. 
Our principal motive for preparing this paper was to complete a technical gictue 
of the incompleteness properties which trouble Hoare’s logic, a picture Iargely 
outlined in the articles already cited. After a brief resume of backgr2und material, we 
give precise definitions for the concepts we use and develop their basic properties. 
Several of these primary definitions are natural generalisations of ideas implicitly 
used in papers such as Clarke [9] and Lipton [la]. in Section 3 we estalblish a general 
sufficient condition for the phenomena just described (Theorem 3.2? and this, too, 
echoes particular observations repeatedly made by earlier writers on the subject; we 
include a complete list of relevant references at the end of the sectio<n. In Section 4 we 
work out the applications of the machinery announced above. 
This paper is a companion to our [7] which reconsiders the relationship between 
the expressiveness of the assertion language L for -%VP over a structure ,LI and the 
completeness of Hoare’s logic HI&Q. Although, strictly speaking, exprcr:ss&~ness 
has no technical role in the present article, some discussion of the pt*operty is 
necessary in order to appreciate the extent to which Hoare’s logic is cormpk te and we 
include notes on this subject in Section 5. Both the present paper and 1171 are !;equeIs 
to [5], written with J. Tiuryn, which deals with technical issues in a theoretical 
analysis of the thesis that a programming language sema,ntics can be uniquely defined 
by a system of proof rules for its constructs; knowledge of [S] is not required, 
however. 
We would like to thank K.R. Apt for his criticisms of an earlier edition of this 
paper. 
1. l?reliminaries on structures, assertions and programs 
In this preparatory section we shall map out the technical prerequisites for the 
paper. In addition to the three important sources Hoare [13], Cook [lo] and Wand 
[25], the reader would do well to consult the survey article [l]. 
By an algebraic system, algebraic structure or, simply, an algebra we shall mean a 
relational structure A of recursively enumerable signature C with constants ci, 
operations cj and relations Rk. 
The first-order language L of some signature 2 is based upon sets of variables 
Xl, x2, l l l for algebraic values and pl, &, . . . for boolean values. The algebraic 
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constant, function and relational symbols of L, are exactly those of C; its boolean 
constant symbols are true, false and its bocllean operation symbols are A, -1. In 
addition, we assume L has equality symbols for its algebraic and boolean sorts as well 
as the usuai logical connectives and quantifiers, The set of all algebraic terms of L we 
denote T(C). 
Using the syntax of L, the class ?V.. of all while-programs (with boolean variables) 
over Z is defined in the customary way. 
Now for an3 algebra A of signature C, the semantics of the first-order language L 
over 2 determined by A has its standard definition in mDde1 theory and this we 
assume to be understood. The set of all assertions of L which are true in A is called 
the firsr-or&r theory 0% A and is denoted Th( A). For the semantics 9’ of -%V over C 
determined by A we leave the reader d’ree to choose any sensible account of 
whife-program computations: [lo]; the grat.ph-theoretic semantics in Greibach [ 121; 
the denotational semantics described in de Bakker [4]. What constraints must be 
placed on this choice are the necessities of formulating and proving certain lemmas, 
such as Lemmas 1 .l and 1.2 below, and of verifying soundness for the standard 
I-Ioare Logic (Theorem 2.1). These conditions will be evident from the text and, for 
such a simple programming formula as -3V9, can h ardly be problematical. For 
definiteness, we have in mind a nai’ve operational semantics based upon appropriate 
A-register machines which yield straightforward definitions of a state in a -WY 
computation and of the length of a ‘KY computation [24]; and a straightforward 
proof of this first fact: 
1.1, Lemma. Let S E -WY involve variables x = (xl, . . . , xn ). Then for each 1 E w there 
is a formula COMP&, y) of L, wherein y := (yl, . . . , y,) are new variables, such that 
for any A and any a, b E A”, A != COMP&z, 6) if, and on!y if, the computation S(a) 
terminates in 1 or less steps leaving the variakiles with values b = (61, . . . , 6, ). 
The reader is also responsible for verifying for his or her semantics the following 
Normal Form Theorem for %9 taken from Mirkowska [al]. 
1.2. Lemma. There is an effective procedure which given any while-program S over 
signature C constructs a new while-program SM over C of the form 
S?l = St; while b do S2 od, 
where S1 and Sz are straight-line programs (over 2 containing the variables of S, such 
that for any Z-algebra A and any input state a E A” either both S(a) and S&(a) 
terminate with the values of their common variables identical, or both S(a) ana! §~(a) 
diverge. 
Putting together the semantics of L and -%Y determined by interpretation A we 
obtain the partial correctness theory PC(A) defined just as in the Introduction. 
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Qur definition of a computable algebraic structure derives from Rabin 1221 and 
Mal’cev [19], independent papers delaoted to founding a general theory u:F comput- 
able algebras and their computable morphisms. 
Let A be a structure of finite signature. Then A is computable if there exists a 
recursive subset $2 of the set of natural numbers u and a surjection CI : ;‘I’ --) A such 
that 
(1) the relation =a defined on 0 by n za m e cyn = cym in A is recursive; and 
(2) for each k-ary operation c and each k-ary relation R of A there exis’t: recursive 
functions & and l? which commute the following diagrams: 
wherein Lyk(x1,. . . , .x.-k) = (axi,. . . , axk) and R is identified with its characteristiSc 
function. 
We shall use a number of concepts and results from the theory of ?hlt: recursil/e 
functions: Turing and man y-one reducibilities ; completeness ; recursively H’nsepnrable 
sets ; the arithmetic hierarchy. With the exception of relativised Turing computabili~:y, 
particularly clear accounts of these subjects can be found in Mal’cev [2O] ,which Iye 
shall cite as we go along. The basic reference for recursion theory remains Rogers 
[23] however, and this should be consulted for any idea or fact not explained or 
referenced here. 
2. Hoare logics 
Let A be a structure. The standard Hoare logic for -Kg over A with assertion 
language L has the usual axioms and proof rules for manipulating asserted while- 
programs and these can be found in [l, 4,10,13]. Worthy of an explicit ci;t.ation is the 
rule of inference known as the Consequence Rule, 
and, in connection with it, the oracle of axioms: Each member of Th(A) ill an asiit3rn* 
The set of all triples of the form { p}S{q}, or asserted programs, derivable from these 
axioms by the proof rules we denote HILo( we write HLo(A) I--- (p}S(q i’ in place of 
{pIs(qI E HLo(A). 
2.1. Theorem. For any algebraic structure A, HLo(A) is sound in the sense that 
HLo(A) c PC(A) and is recursively enumerable in Tlr(A). 
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Thje firsi statement is contained in Section 5 of [lo]. The second statement is 
implicit in Setztion 6of [ 101 and is obvious anyway; this latter pro??erty we take as our 
definition of a Hoare logic: 
A, Noare logic for WY over A with assertio)rl ailguage L is any subset HL(A) of 
L x %Y.%~ x L which is recursively enumerable relative to Th(A). 
A Hoarc logic l-IL(A) is sound if, and only if, HL(A) c PC(A) and it is (relatively) 
complete if W.&t) = PC(A). 
These definitions are implicit in [ 175 and [!?I. 
2,:t. Propmitim. Let A be any algebraic structure and HL(A) a Hoare logic for -WV 
on A. Then 
61) HL(A) is r,e. in Th(A) and 
(2) PC(A) is co-r.e. in Th(A). 
Proof. 0% course statement (1) follows by definition. Consider (2j. Let p, 4 E L and 
$ E. ~W”, For each k E o, let Qk (p, I”;, 4) be this sentence in L,, derived from Lemma 
1.1: 
Now observe that 
eAi=Qk(p,S,q) foreachk 
HVk , [Q&7, s, @Th(A)]. 
Thus PC(A) ,is co-r.e. in Th(A). 
2,3. Theomm There exists a sound and relative complete Hoare-like logic l-K(A) for 
WY on A & and only if, PC(A) is recursive in Th( A). 
Proof. Trivially, if PC(A) is recursive in Th(A) then it qualifies as a Hoare logic 
which is sound and relatively complete. On the other hand, if HL(A) is some sound 
and retatively complete Hoare logic then PC(A) = I-IL(A) and, by Proposition 2.2, 
l-IL(A) is both r.e. and co-r.e. in Th(A). 
A basic reference poim for the next section is this particular case of Theorem 2.3. 
2.4, CorokJary. Let A be an algebra with decidable first-order theory. Then A has a 
hound and re!lativeby complete .Hoare logic for wg over A if, and only if, its partial 
correctness theory is decidable. 
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3. The halting problem and decidable theories 
Let {P, : e E o} be a recursive enumeration of ?V’P over the signature of algebra A. 
In the case A = N, the standard model of arithmetic, the halting problem for *w$P 
over N can be defined as 
K ={(e, n): P,(n)J}co X0. 
And it is, well known that K is an r.e., non-recursive set (because whila!-programs 
compute the recursive functions on N). Indeed, K is a complete r,e. se<!, mefIning: 
every r.e. subset of o is many-one reducible to K. (Remember that X C- o is mangy-one 
reducible to Y c w if there exists a recursive function f: w + w sucir thilt n E 
X ~2f(n) E Y; in symbols X Go Y.) We want to define a number-theon:tic halting 
problem for %4P on any A and we shall do this by syntactically modelling ‘:he catural 
algebraic halting problem {(e, a): P,(a)&} E o x A restricted to the mininsal C- 
subalgebra MINX(A) of A. The algebra MINX(A) is, by definition, the Z’-+;ubaigebra 
of A generated from the constants of A by its operations. Its connection with ri:!yntax 
is that it is the image of the valuation map v : T(2) + A which is defined Pty ay@gning 
to each operation symbol and constant symboi in t the function and element the) 
name in A and then evaluating. Thus T(C) is a recursive set of names f’sjr tht: 
elements of MINE (A). 
By a state formula we mean a formula in L of the form /‘&=I xi = ti wkxs: Xi is a 
variable of k and ti E T(Z) is a term of L, 1 s i 6 n. 
Let (4i: i E o} be a recursive enumeration of all state formulae. Then by the halting 
problem for W9 on A we shall here mean the set K(A) c w x o defined 'by 
K(A) = {(e, i): Pe and & have the same variables, say 
x = (x1:, . l . , x,A, and A b qbi(x)+ P,(x)& 
clearly, K(N) is (recursively isomorphic to) K. 
3.1. Lemma. The set lK(A) is many-one reducible to PC(A). In pakx/ar, if 
K(N) snzK (A) then PC(A) is not recursive. 
Proof, This is immediate because (e, i) & K(A) if, and only if, either the velriables of 
Pe and c;bi fail to match or {&}Pe{f&e} E PC(A). 
We generate our examples from this technical fact. 
3.2. Theorem. Suppose Th(A) to be decidable and that K(N) r’s many-on? reducible 
to K (A). Let I-IL(A) be any sound Hoare logic for -WY on A extending t f E standard 
Hoare logic HLo(A); that is HLo(A) c HE(A) c K(A). Then 
(1) HL(A) is r.e. but not recursive ; 
(2) W(A) is co-r.e. but not recursive ; indeed, PC(A) is a complete co-r. e. set. 
In particular, A has no sound and complete Hoare logic for its lwhile-prog.r*ams. 
316 J.A. Bergstra, J. V. Tucker 
Proof,, The absence of completeness for Hoare logics is an application of Corollary 
2.4 to statement (2). Statement (2) is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.2 
and Lemma 3.1 e Thus the concern for completeness can be settled quite easily. More 
dificult is the proof that A has no sound, but incomplete, recursive Hoare logic. 
Consider statement ( 1) 
Let U and V be t*vo disjoint r.e. subsets of w which are recursively inseparable. 
This means there does not exist a recursive set 1Z such that U c R and V c 1R (to 
see why such se::) a’;xist consult [20, p. 2ZO]). 
Since K(N) s ,K(A), and K(N) is many-one complete for all r.e. sets, we can 
choose recursive fxgnctions U, v, f, g L o + w such that 
wherein x = (XI,. . . , xJ, y = (~1,. , . , ys> and these depend on n. 
Without loss of generality we can assume these expressions between formulae and 
programs to have the following normal forms: 
(i) both Pjtn, and &,,nJ have the form 
P = 5; while b do S’ od 
where S and S’ are loop-free programs; 
(ii) both pfinI and Qn, have disjoint sets of variables; 
(iii) the formulae 4U(nJ and &(nI are A-equivalent: A t= &n)++4virl)* 
Each condition can be met by applying recursive transformations of programs and 
formulae. Step (i) is provided for by Lemma 1.2 and steps (ii) and (iii) are triviaf to 
arrange effectively. Thus we assume these transformations have been eeected and, 
retaining the notation u, v, f, g for the normalised reduction maps, take 
By piecing these programs together we define a recursive function d : w -+ W. Let 
Z&, be the following program wherein TURN is a boolean variable: 
Sff,,,; Sgtn,; TURN := true; 
while bfc,, A b,(,, do if TURN then S;(,*) else SL(,, fi; 
TUR,v := -I TURN ; 
od; 
It is easy to check that 
for all n & U, A I= {&ut,,~}P,lf,,j{TURN = 
for all n& V, A l={&,~n~}Pd~~n~(TN = 
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And, moreover, since 4 u(n) and Qlv(n) are A-equivalent, that 
A i= 9ju(,,) + Pd(,,)& if, and only if, n E U u V. 
3.3. Lemma. 
n E U imp&s HI&A) I-- {4u(n~)Pd(n I( TURN = false}, 
n E V impfies I%(A) I-- {4Dfn))Pd(nj{ TURN = &ue}. 
On proving the lem,ma we can involve any HLo(A) c HL(A) c PC(A) in a separa- 
tion of U, V. Thus, for any such Hoare Logic HL(A) define A : o -3’ w 5y 
h(n)= 
0, if HL(A) I- (#,(,1}&(n){ TURN = false), 
1, otherwise. 
Clearly A is recursive in HL(A) and, by the above constructions and Lemma 3.3, A 
separates U, V since n E IJ :+ A (n) = 0 and n E V =$ h (n) = 1. If HL(A) were recur- 
sive then this1 would contradict the iuseparability of U and V. Thus HL (A) is r.e. but 
not recursive. 
Lemma 3.3 is obtained from this general fact. 
3.4. Completeness Theorem for terminating closed programs. L?er' A be amy algebra 
and let HLo(A) be the standard Hoare logic for W9 over A with asslertiou language L. 
Let 4, +b be state formulae and let S be a while-program having !he sfrme variables 
x = (Xl, . . . , x,J. If 
Proof. This is done by induction on the complexity of S. The basis ancr most cases of 
the induction step are easy and are omitted. We consider only the cab;;e 
S = while b do SO od. 
So suppose for such S that A l=4(x)+ S(x)i and /4 t={4jS{$}; and assume 
Lemma 3.4 is true of So. 
Let the computation which 4 determines r’rom S on MINr(A]~ involve I executions 
of So. And let 4’, . . . , 4’ be state formulae defining the initial states at each of these 
executions together with the final state. Thus, these formulae are defined inductively 
by 4’=4 and 4’ = that formula, unique up to A-equivalence, such that 
A I= {4i}S,{4i+‘). 
Setting 6 = vf=, 4’ we see clearly from its construction that 
At=4(x)+B(x) and Al=@(x)Alb(x)+$(x) 
and that we have now to prove HLo(A) +{0 A b}&(6). 
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But A i== 8(x j A b(x)d/~L: ,&(x) and A != Vi’= 1 @(AT) + O(x). Therefore, it is 
sufMent to show 
The induction hypothesis says tildt for each 0 G i C I 
.HEo(.A) t- (&}SO{~‘~ ‘j 
and to string these proofs together it is enough to apply the following derived proof 
rule of HLo(A); for any ~1, p2,91,92~ L and any SE WY 
{ pr)s{911, (@(92) __-- 
{PI v P2Mfl V 4 
. 
To verify this is indeed a derived rule of HLo(A) is an eas:lr induction on proof lengths. 
3.5. Notes on the literature. Theorem 3,2 gives an explicit and definitive form t,I> 
observations made by several authors about the connecdon between the terminiation 
of programs and the completeness of Hoare’s logic, All these observations arc? 
subsumed by tAe following remark in Section 2.7 of [l] wi’lich is a starting point for 
the formulation of Theorem 3.2: 
If the ha!kyg problem for programs in WP is undecidable on an interpretation A thev 
PC(A) is not r.e. because A I= (true}S(Mse} if, and only if, S E W9 fails to ha2 on a !I 
initiaf values qf its variables. Therefore, if HLo(A) is r-e. thelrz HLo(A) f PC(A). 
Once one has framed the concepts of the formal halting problem K(A) and of a 
Hoare-Me logic, one can obtain the last statement of Theorem 3.2 from this general 
remark, but not the theorem’s main slratements (1) and (2), of course. The origin of 
Apt’s obserbjation is the argument of Theorem 2 in [lo] which shows that HLo(A) is 
incompiete in case A is Presburger Arithmetic; and we again find it in use in [9], there 
applied to finite structures A which interpret much richer programming languages 
than WV with undecidable halting problems for IAl 2 2. Actually, the termination of 
programs over finite interpretations was considered, independently of Hoare’s logic, 
in Langmaack [14,15]; for example the observation applies there to sharpen one of 
Clarke’s incompleteness results to include structures A with IA I= 1, and it a;speai ;. 
often in Langmaack and Olderog’s extensive studies of Hoare-like logics for the 
higher progralm languages, see [16f and the references there cited. 
However, Theorem 3.2 should n:Jt be confused with any interesting fact about the 
incompleteness of Hoare-like logics addressing the issue of totaZ correctness. As :t 
happens HL(A) is not even sound for asserted programs with their total correctGe!:s 
semantics; and indeed L is unable to support any logic for total correctness as mziy 
easily be surmiced from remarks in Section 2.6 of [l]. 
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4. Examples 
The basic reference for information about decidable first-order theories is Err.hot 
et al, [ll]. Here we choose to mention a few structures with decidable theories which 
lead to easily appreciated examples for incompleteness: 
(1) Yresburger’s &4rithmetic having domain o, constant 0 E o and operation the 
successor function on W; 
(2) any algebraically closed field such as the comple:K numbers or algebraic 
numbers; 
(3) any real closed field such as the real numbers or real algebraic numbers. 
In each case it is easy to verify the halting problem hypothesis in Theorem 3.2 
providing, of course, one chooses fields of characteristic zero: the standard halting 
problem K is recursively isomorphic to K(A) when A is Paesburger Arithmetic and 
since this structure can be embedded in the field of rational numbers Q, which is the 
prime subfield of any field F of characteristic: zero, the reduction 
K(N) %X(Q) s,JK(F) follows. 
For a finer comparison with the standard situation A = N we prefer to choosle 
computable structures (and also we have in mind the role Llf computable inter- 
pretations in [ 171). Presburger Arithmetic is clearly computablti. To obtain cornput-, 
able fields of kinds (2) and (3) one applies the following theorems from Rabin [22] 
and Madison [18] respectively. Let F be a computable field. Then the algebraic 
closure of F is computable, If, in a.dditiow, F has a computable ordering then the 
real closure of F is computable. 
5. Concluding remarks on expressiveness and completeness 
Cook’s discussion of the completeness of Hoare’s logic begins with the fact that 
HLo(A) is incomplete when A is Presburger Arithmetic and continues with the 
observation that a particular source o- C difficuity in attempting to assess the 
completeness of Hoare’s system is that the assertion language on which it is based 
may not be able to define all the invariants for loops. Thus, Cook defines a not 
necessarily first-order assertion language AL to be expressive for “?VY over structure 
A if for each assertion & E AL and program S E -Wg the strongest postcondition 
sp,&, S) is definable in AL. In our situaticen AL, is fixed as the first-order language L 
so expressiveness is a property of interpresations; for example, the standard model of 
arithmetic is expressive, blut Presburger Arithkmetic is not. Cook showed that if AL is 
expressive for -WY over A then I-ILo(A) Ss compk8e and one now says that Moare’s 
logic is complete in the ser:!re of Cook because whenever the ass’ertion language is not 
troubled by its own interaal inadequacies then the system is indeed complete. Does 
this perceptive theoreticas analysis resbn t v -Z-r@ the incompleteness phenomena noticed 
for Presburger Arithmetic and extensively analysed in l;his paper? We believe it does 
not. 
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The problems begin with the paucity of structures which turn out to be expressive 
and with the existence of natural structures for whic*h nothing resembling a complete 
Hoare logic can be made even for whil’e-programs. A theorem about the expressive 
structures by de Mills, Lipton and Snyder, announced in [ 1’71, emphasises the first 
point: 
if L is ,txpressivefor ?VP over A then either (1) a standard model of arithmetic can be 
s _s 
& pa$ iz -4 or {Z) .~ror each S E &Hf9 there is y1 = n(S) E o such that S reaches at most n 
states in any computation over A. 
Thus such structurt:s either contain arithmetic in a first-order definable wgy and so are 
subject to the logical pathologies characteristic of arithmetic or else they are 
essentially uniformly locally finite structures on which one can compute l’ery little 
<see [24)). 
Secondly, come problems with the r&e of expressiveness in completeness 
arguments. Finite structures are expressive and so Clarke’s work shows that when the 
programming languages grow more complicated then expressiveness can no longer 
guarantee the existence of a complete Hoare logic. On the other hand, expressive- 
ness is not even a necesszlry condition for completeness: in r1] we point out structures 
A where Hb(A) is complete, but L is not expressive for WP over A. (However we 
have not yet found computable structures for which this is the case.) 
Thirdly, it should be remembered that the quest for completeness for Hoare-like 
!ogics H’L(A), using the first-order theory of the interpretation A as oracle, ignores 
the original idea that the systems should be based upon an axiomatic specification of 
the data types on which the programs compute (see [13]). It seems to us that this 
connection between data type specifications and form;?lised correctness concerns is 
one which is worth recovering even at the expense of the fine completeness theorems 
Cook was able to provide; an experiment of this kind, relying solely on algebraic 
specifications for data types, is [h] and its completeness theorem should be compared 
with Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.1 in [2]. ,;\ bold a’rtempt o think through the 
depressing theoretical problems which beset total correctness has been made by 
Back in [3]. 
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